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The Attorney Accountability Act: A
Case Study of the Complexities of
Incentive-Based Legal Reform
Jamie S. Henikoff & Scott R. Peppet
The recent "litigation explosion" has not only burdened court
dockets, but has also led many to question the ongoing vitality and
integrity of our legal system. In an attempt to address these con-
cerns, legislatures have increasingly tried to curb meritless suits by
reining in litigants and their attorneys. One common reform ap-
proach is incentive-based; it centers on altering the costs of going to
trial. Last year, Congress considered a bill intended to encourage
early settlement by requiring litigants to weigh the cost of opposing
attorneys' fees in their pre-trial settlement decisions. This comment
analyzes the proposed Attorney Accountability Act (the Act)' and em-
ploys several analytical tools from the negotiation field to highlight
some of the drawbacks of such incentive-based approaches to legal
reform. In particular, the concepts of strategic interaction, opportu-
nism and risk preferences, and principal-agent dynamics illuminate
some of the unforeseen barriers to effecting such legislation.
I. WHY Focus ON Ti ATrORNEY AccouNTABIuY AcT?
The Act, if passed, would amend federal civil procedure Rule 68
by creating a two-way offer-of-settlement rule by which parties could
seek compensation for certain attorneys' fees.2 This provision is
meant to deter meritless lawsuits by increasing incentives to settle
claims early and out of court. The changes provide that if a litigant
rejects a settlement offer, proceeds to trial, and ultimately fares
worse under the final judgment than she would under the terms of
the settlement offer, that litigant must pay the offeror's post-offer
costs and attorneys' fees.3
1. See H.R. 988, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
2. See id. at § 2. The Act also contains two related provisions: (1) a revision of
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to include an "honesty in evidence rule, see
id. at § 3, and (2) an augmentation of Rule 11 attorney sanctions, see id. at § 4.
3. See id. at § 2(e)(6).
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Although the Act did not become law,4 analysis of this fee-shift-
ing provision is important for several reasons. First, the Act is typi-
cal of incentive-based approaches to legal reform. It is meant to
create certain consequences by changing the costs and benefits par-
ties incur in litigation. Incentive-based approaches are pervasive;
many states already have fee-shifting statutes, 5 and the comparative
advantages of various background incentive rules have been the sub-
ject of much analysis. 6 Precisely because procedural changes like
those in the Act can influence millions of ordinary people seeking ac-
cess to judicial relief, thorough analysis is important.
Second, a great deal of legal commentary has advocated increas-
ing the severity of Rule 68 by requiring shifts in attorneys' fees in
addition to mere court costs. 7 Scholars have argued that Rule 68's
current focus on court costs limits its effectiveness as a deterrent and
that increasing the burdens borne by intransigent litigants will only
further the Rule's underlying purpose of encouraging early and effi-
cient settlement. Although the discussion in this comment focuses
solely on the Attorney Accountability Act, the concepts employed are
generalizable to future attempts at and debate over incentive-based
legal reform.
II. THE ATTORNEY ACCOUNTABILITY ACT: FORESEEN EFFECTS
A. Provisions
Section Two of the Act provides a framework under which the
proposed offer-of-settlement fee-shifting mechanism would operate.8
The Act's fee-shifting mandate is only triggered in cases involving
federal diversity litigation, where the court possesses existing juris-
diction over the underlying action, and when the relevant offer was
made at least ten days prior to trial.9 Specifically, if a party receives
4. The Act was referred to Senate Committee on March 15, 1995. See 141 CONG.
REC. S3963 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1995). No action has been taken on it since.
5. Many states have implemented fee-shifting and offer-of-settlement rules.
See, e.g., CAL. CIv. Paoc. CODE §§ 998, 1021.5 (West 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-17-202 (West 1995); IOWA CODE ANN. § 677.10 (West 1994).
6. See generally Clinton F. Beckner III & Avery Katz, The Incentive Effects of
Litigation Fee Shifting When Legal Standards are Uncertain, 15 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 205 (1995); John J. Donohue IlI, Commentary: Opting for the British Rule, or If
Posner and Shavell Can't Remember the Coase Theorem, Who Will?, 104 HARv. L.
REv. 1093 (1991).
7. See generally David A. Anderson, Improving Settlement Devices: Rule 68 and
Beyond, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1994).
8. See H.R. 988, supra note 1, at § 2.
9. See id. at § 2(e)(1).
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an ultimate judgment at trial that is less favorable than an offer that
she rejected prior to trial, then that party must bear the other side's
costs, expenses, and reasonable attorneys' fees from either the date
upon which the rejected offer was filed, or the last date upon which
she made a counter-offer.' 0 The Act allows parties to make as many
offers as they wish, with the understanding that none of the rejected
offers may be used as evidence in trial." In addition, the Act grants
courts the discretion, with or without a party's motion, to exempt
from the proposed fee-shifting rule any claims that present novel
questions of law or fact or that may substantially impact non-par-
ties.12 Finally, the rule is not to be applied to claims seeking equita-
ble remedies. 13
The Act moderates the impact of the fee-shifting requirement in
two principle ways. First, courts are given the discretion not to
award fees if to do so would be "manifestly unjust."14 Second, the Act
limits recovery to those fees that are deemed "reasonable" based on
attorney qualifications, comparable hourly rates, number of hours
worked, etc.15 The Act also specifically states that shifted fees may
not exceed either the offeree's actual attorneys' fees or - if the offeree
is operating under a contingency fee arrangement - the estimated




Although the House of Representatives passed the Act very
quickly, and thus left scant legislative record, the Act's various goals
can be gleaned from the congressional debate. First and foremost,
the Act was intended to reduce the burden on federal courts and in-
crease efficiency in the federal judicial process. 17 It was hoped that
the fee-shifting proposal would encourage early settlement,' 8 and
10. See id. at § 2(e)(6).
11. The only exception to this rule is that parties can use rejected offers as evi-
dence to enforce a settlement or to determine costs under the Act. See id. at § 2(e)(3).
12. See H.R. 988, supra note 1, at § 2(e)(4).
13. See id. at § 2(e)(8).
14. See id. at § 2(e)(6).
15. See id. at § 2(e)(7).
16. See H.R. 988, supra note 1, at § 2(e)(7).
17. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REc. H-2663, H2675 (daily ed. March 6, 1995) (statement
of Rep. Harman) (arguing that H.R. 988 "will cause more lawsuits to be voluntarily
dismissed and will help restore some efficiency to our Federal legal system").
18. See 141 CONG. REc. E565 (daily ed. March 9, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Stokes).
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would reduce the number of meritless claims brought to court.19 As
Mr. Packard argued on the House floor, the Act was meant to "cur-
tail[ I] frivolous lawsuits, opening the system to legitimate griev-
ances."20 According to Mr. Baker, the fee-shifting proposal was
crafted to "put[ ] a stop to get-rich-quick, lottery-style lawsuits where
litigants have little to lose and everything to gain."
21
In addition, the House expected that the Act would have several
secondary effects. First, some members predicted that the Act would
reduce so-called "defendant shopping," in which plaintiffs sue many
defendants in hopes of finding one with "deep pockets." This practice
might, in theory, be reduced if plaintiffs incur additional risks - of
paying opposing counsels' fees - for each additional defendant they
name.22 In addition, as its title suggests, the Act was designed to in-
crease responsibility and self-restraint within the legal profession.
23
A simple example of the fee-shifting mechanism may help to il-
lustrate its intended effect. Assume that a case involves a contract
claim for one million dollars. If both parties are risk neutral and each
has a different expected value (EV) of the outcome of trial, the case
may not settle. For example, if the plaintiff expects to be awarded
$550,000 at trial while incurring $100,000 in transaction costs (T),
she should be willing to accept an offer as low as $450,000 (EV - T). If
the defendant expects the award to be $300,000 after incurring
$100,000 in transaction costs, she would be willing to propose an offer
as high as $400,000 (EV + T). Because the risk-neutral parties' set-
tlement points are $50,000 apart, analysis suggests that this case
would proceed to court.
If the Act were in effect, however, the settlement points might
shift enough to create a bargaining range between the parties. As-
sume that the plaintiff has made an opening offer of $500,000 and
that the defendant has countered with an offer of $350,000; without
the Act's fee-shifting provision neither party would be willing to set-
tle because each party's expected return from going to court would be
19. The traditional "American rule" is often said to encourage meritless litiga-
tion. See Gregory E. Maggs & Michael D. Weiss, Progress on Attorney's Fees: Ex-
panding the 'Loser Pays" Rule in Texas, 30 Hous. L. REv. 1915, 1924 (1994).
20. 141 CONG. REC. E545 (daily ed. March 8, 1995) (statement of Rep. Packard).
21. 141 CONG. REC. E542 (daily ed. March 7, 1995) (statement of Rep. Baker).
22. See 139 CoNG. REc. S16936, S16942 (daily ed. Nov. 22, 1993) (statement of
Sen. DeConcini) (discussing defendant shopping).
23. See 141 CONG. REC. E566 (daily ed. March 9, 1995) (statement of Rep. Pack-
ard) ("The only winners in the game of lawsuit abuse are the lawyers."); 141 CoNG.
REc. H2661-62 (daily ed. March 6, 1995) (statement of Rep. Goss) (considering in-
creases in number of practicing attorneys and costs they impose on American society).
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more attractive. The presence of a fee-shifting rule, however,
changes each party's economic assessment of her situation. Under
the Act, each party now must incorporate into her calculations the
possibility that she will be responsible for the other side's attorneys'
fees.
The fee-shifting rule drives the plaintiff's settlement point down-
ward. Specifically, the plaintiff's settlement point changes from
Equation 1 to Equation 2.
Equation 1: EV - T
Equation 2: EV - T - ((Attorneys' Fees of Defendant)
* (the chance of having the final judgment be less than the
offer))
Assuming that the defendant's post-offer transaction costs will be
$100,000 and that the plaintiff believes there to be a 40 percent
chance that the final judgment will be less than $350,000, the plain-
tiff's settlement point will shift from EV ($550,000) - T ($100,000), or
$450,000, to EV ($550,000) - T ($100,000) - (Fees of Defendant
($100,000) * Chance of Judgment being lower than $350,000 (40%)).
This equals $410,000.
A similar transformation occurs for the defendant, driving her
settlement point higher. If the plaintiff's post-offer fees will be
$100,00024 and the defendant believes there to be a 25% chance that
the final judgment will be for more than the plaintiff's offer
($500,000), the original settlement point of $400,000, derived from
EV ($300,000) + T ($100,000), becomes EV ($300,000) + T ($100,000)
+ (Post-Offer Attorneys' Fees of Plaintiff ($100,000) * Chance of Judg-
ment being greater than $500,000 (25%)). Under these circum-
stances, the defendant's settlement point rises to $425,000.
The existence of a fee-shifting rule shifts each party's settlement
point enough to create an overlapping settlement range that did not
exist previously. In the above case, each party would rather settle
somewhere in the range of $410,000 - $425,000 than litigate.
The Act's intended effect of promoting early settlement may,
therefore, be fulfilled in situations similar to the outlined hypotheti-
cal. As explained above, however, this illustration of the fee-shifting
24. In order to simplify the example, we have assumed that the plaintiff and the
defendant incur equivalent attorneys' fees. When the litigants' attorneys' fees differ,
the Act provides that a litigant is only liable for the other side's fees up to the amount
that the litigant herself spent on attorneys. For example, if the other side incurred
$100,000 in attorneys' fees and the litigant only incurred $80,000 in attorneys' fees,
the litigant is only liable for $80,000 of the other side's attorneys' fees. See H.R. 988,
supra note 1, at § 2(e)(7).
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mechanism has been simplified to demonstrate the Act's intended ef-
fect; it is very possible that many of the problems discussed below
will prevent the Act from achieving its stated purposes.
The Act was also designed to discourage meritless claims. Theo-
retically, contingency fee arrangements allow plaintiffs to litigate du-
bious claims with little risk. If the case is lost, the plaintiff loses
nothing and their lawyer absorbs the cost of wasted time and effort.
Attorneys working under such arrangements may file claims even if
meritless because the potential for a large payoff (whether through
erroneous judgment or settlement) compensates for the possibility of
loss. 25
The proposed fee-shifting rule could help to discourage meritless
claims by introducing an element of risk into a plaintiff's decision-
making. Instead of bringing risk-free suits, plaintiffs would now
have to balance the possibility of gain against the risk of being re-
sponsible for the other side's fees. This may filter some meritless
claims.
C. Costs
Despite its potential benefits, the Act faced criticism in Congress
on at least four grounds. First, some argued that the increased deter-
rent effects of the revised Rule 68 would be over-inclusive. According
to the dissenting Rules and Procedures Committee report, the Act's
"fatal flaw ... is that it does not distinguish between frivolous cases
and the much larger class of cases in which liability is a close call."
26
Particularly for those cases in which the question of liability is deter-
minative - cases in which the plaintiff expects to receive either a
very large judgment or nothing at all - the Act might deter a pro-
spective plaintiff from bringing an otherwise meritorious action for
fear of incurring her opponent's high attorneys' fees.
Second, opponents contended that the Act would have the great-
est effect on risk averse litigants who could not comfortably carry the
25. Many commentators have discussed the failure of Rule 11 to alleviate this
problem. See generally Karen K. Cain, Frivolous Litigation, Discretionary Sanction-
ing and a Safe Harbor: The 1993 Revision of Rule 11, 43 KAN. L. REv. 207 (1994);
Cynthia A. Leiferman, The 1993 Rule 11 Amendments: The Transformation of the
Venomous Viper into the Toothless Tiger?, 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 497 (1994).
26. H.R. REP. No. 62, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1995) (dissenting views).
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increased risk of attorneys' fees.27 Moreover, many argued that be-
cause less wealthy litigants tend to be risk averse, the Act would dis-
parately impact this group. Thus, assuming that risk aversion
generally bears an inverse relationship to a party's resources, the Act
benefits the rich.
Third, opponents argued that the Act will not deter frivolous
claims. Instead, such claims will be lodged in state courts, which are
unaffected by changes to Rule 68.2s While some held that this forum
shift represents an unconstitutional deprivation of the right to fed-
eral diversity jurisdiction,29 most merely employed this argument to
attack the Act's practical efficacy.30
Finally, the Aces opponents - both Republican and Democrat -
argued that it fails to live up to its name; it does little to change law-
yers" incentives directly, and instead merely affects litigants' decision-
making.31 Because the costs of the proposed fee-shifting mechanism
are borne by the litigants and not their attorneys, it is difficult to
imagine how this section of the Act increases "attorney accountabil-
ity." We take up this subject in more detail below.
I. ANALYSIS OF THE ATToRNEY AccouNTABIrry AcT
As shown, the Act's drafters intended to affect litigants' settle-
ment decisions. Influencing settlement dynamics through an incen-
tive-based mechanism, however, may be more complex than the Aces
drafters assumed. Various concepts from negotiation analysis -
27. See 141 CONG. REC. E565 (daily ed. March 9, 1995) (statement of Rep. Stokes)
("H.R. 988 locks the Federal courthouse doors, and gives the rich the key."); 141 Co.IG.
REc. E542 (daily ed. March 7, 1995) (statement of Rep. Pomeroy) ('This bill alters the
playing field between parties to a lawsuit and gives all the benefits to the large finan-
cially secure party."); 141 CONG. REc. H2735, H2747 (daily ed. March 7, 1995) (state-
ment of Rep. Schroeder) ("The goal of deterring frivolous lawsuits is a worthy one.
However, H.R. 988s loser pays provision goes well beyond that; it gives a wealthy
party the power to slam the courthouse door shut in the face of a middle-income or
poor individual with a reasonably strong case.").
28. See H.R. REp. No. 62, supra note 26, at 29 (dissenting views) ("Because the
fee-shifting provision of H.R. 988 applies only in diversity cases, the effect of the rule
will be to shift cases to the state courts, rather than to deter them altogether.").
29. See 141 CONG. REc. E565 (daily ed. March 9, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Stokes).
30. See H.R. REP. No. 62, supra note 26, at 29 (dissenting views).
31. See 141 CONG. REc. H2735, H2746 (daily ed. March 7, 1995) (statement of
Rep. Smith) ("[Tihis bill as currently written does little to make attorneys accountable
.... [U]nder H.R. 988 as currently drafted, attorneys seeking a big, contingency fee
payday have an incentive to litigate weak cases aggressively. If the client wins, the
lawyer cashes in. If the client loses, the client is stuck with the bill.").
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strategic interaction, opportunism and risk preferences, and princi-
pal-agent tensions - each provide insight into difficulties the Act
may encounter in practice.
A. The Effects of Strategic Interaction
Strategic interaction "arises when two or more individuals inter-
act and each individual's decision turns on what that individual ex-
pects the others to do."3 2 The process requires iterative decision-
making: considering one's actions in light of what one knows about an
opponent's probable actions, what one expects the opponent knows
about one's own actions, and so forth. As John Geanakoplos has
noted, "when rational agents interact, they think about what the
others know and do not know, and what the others know about what
they know, before choosing how to act. Failing to do so can be
disastrous."33
This core negotiation concept sheds light on some of the Act's
probable secondary effects. The Act is intended to encourage settle-
ment by raising the potential risks and costs of proceeding to trial.
Although the Act was promoted as a tool to discourage meritless
claims, many members of Congress recognized that the proposed fee-
shifting mechanism could also have a significant impact on risk-
averse parties whether or not their claims are justified. Specifically,
some feared that deep-pocketed repeat players would take advantage
of the proposed rule by offering extremely low settlement proposals
very early in the process. Offers as low as $1 could start the "fee-
shifting clock" running and induce extremely risk-averse parties to
settle regardless of the merits of their case. 34
To address this problem, Congress added a provision to the Act to
provide that attorneys' fees would be calculated "from the date the
last such offer was made or, if the offeree made an offer under this
subsection, from the date the last such offer by the offeree was
made."35 This clause removes the early low offer problem by allowing
risk-averse parties to "restart the clock" with the presentation of a
32. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 1 (1994); see also
THoMAs C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLIrT 160 (1960).
33. John Geanakoplos, Common Knowledge, 6 J. ECON. PERSP. 53, 53 (1992).
34. See 141 CONG. REc. H2735 (daily ed. March 7, 1995) (statement of Mr.
Smith).
35. H.R. 988, supra note 1, at § 2(5) (emphasis added). See 141 CONG. REC.
H2735, 2736 (daily ed. March 7, 1995) (statement of Rep. Moorhead) (discussing abil-
ity to limit fee shifting by making a late final offer).
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counter-offer. Unfortunately, because of the effects of strategic inter-
action, the provision may diminish the Act's overall effectiveness.
Without the provision, offerors were driven to make a settlement
proposal early in the litigation process in order to start the fee-shift-
ing clock ticking as soon as possible. Offerees had incentives to ac-
cept these early proposals because rejection exposed them to the risk
of having to compensate the other side for its post-offer attorneys'
fees. The new provision, however, drastically alters the situation.
Because of strategic interaction, the offeror will consider probable
moves by the offeree when deciding the timing and amount of an of-
fer. As she will anticipate a "clock restarting" counter-offer eleven
days prior to trial, the offeror realizes that she will recover the same
level of attorneys' fees regardless of the timing of her initial offer.
Likewise, the offeree feels no pressure to accept an early offer, be-
cause she recognizes that the timing of the offer has no impact on her
future possible liability. Each, in effect, anticipates this "final" move
by the offeree eleven days prior to trial.3 6 This strategic anticipation
eliminates the incentives for early settlement.
This effect is particularly problematic because it vastly reduces
the amount of attorneys' fees that are ultimately at stake, and
thereby diminishes the Act's impact on the offeree's decision-making
process. Although a significant amount of attorneys' fees are gener-
ated early in litigation - while writing briefs, engaging in discovery,
etc. - these fees will not be recoverable so long as the offeree
counter-offers eleven days prior to trial. Thus, in an attempt to pro-
tect risk-averse parties from questionable behavior by deep-pocketed
repeat players, the drafters may have vitiated the Act.
B. The Effects of Opportunism and Risk Preferences
The Attorney Accountability Act is premised on the assumption
that increasing the risks and potential costs associated with trial will
promote early settlement and discourage meritless claims. As
demonstrated above, the Act assumes that as parties begin to factor
fee-shifting risks into their settlement point calculations, a bargain-
ing range will develop, thus encouraging early settlement. In this
section we consider the effect of another core negotiation concept -
strategic opportunism - on the Actes effectiveness.
36. Note that the counter-offer need not be reasonable, as a plaintiff can "restart
the clock" with any counter-offer, including a reinstated demand for the full amount of
the claim.
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Parties behave opportunistically when they pursue strategies
that maximize their own benefit even if their strategy imposes mar-
ginally greater costs on the other party. Strategic opportunism de-
scribes the well-known fact that many negotiators employ tactics to
"claim" value - and grab a larger slice of the proverbial pie - even
at the expense of opportunities to create value or "enlarge" the pie.
37
Although the concept is generally applied to individual negotiations,
here we examine the effects of opportunism in situations where a
given defendant must negotiate with many different plaintiffs over
time.
In such cases, as some commentators have noted, increasing the
level of risk associated with trial - for example, by adding the risk of
having to compensate the other side for attorneys' fees - can have
the counter-intuitive effect of decreasing the number of early settle-
ments.3 8 When deep-pocketed repeat-player defendants negotiate
with one-shot plaintiffs - the typical tort case brought by an individ-
ual against a large corporation - increased levels of risk may en-
courage defendants to offer low-ball settlements in order to sort
plaintiffs and benefit from risk-averse individuals.3 9
Repeat players may behave opportunistically in such situations
by calculating their costs and benefits across all of the cases in which
they are involved. To maximize their returns, they may low-ball with
most plaintiffs in hopes of getting low-cost settlements with at least
some. Although this tactic would aid the repeat player over time, it
would also increase the number of cases going to trial because many
plaintiffs will reject the repeat player's seemingly hardball demands.
Nevertheless, if enough risk-averse plaintiffs will settle for meager
payments, the lowball strategy will compensate for the extra trial
costs that the defendant incurs.
An example will clarify this point. Assume one hundred different
tort cases are brought by one hundred different plaintiffs against a
single corporation, with each case claiming $1 million in damages. If
both the plaintiffs and the defendant assume that the expected value
(EV) of each trial is $300,000, and each party anticipates that
$50,000 will be spent in transaction costs (T) by each side in each
37. See DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER As NEGOTIATOR: BAR-
GAINING FOR COOPERATION AND CoMPETITIVE GAIN 158 (1986).
38. See Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, Pretrial Negotiations With Asymmetric In-
formation on Risk Preferences, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 273, 273-74 (1994) (arguing
that factors which increase risks of trial may actually lead to fewer pre-trial settle-
ments due to strategic behavior of defendants).
39. See id. at 274-76.
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case, then a risk-neutral plaintiff should be willing to settle the case
for $250,000 (EV -T). A risk-averse plaintiff, however, would be will-
ing to settle for less in order to be assured some payment.
If the defendant corporation cannot predict in advance which
plaintiffs are risk neutral and which are risk averse,40 the defend-
ants settlement strategy may rest on its estimate of the risk-averse
plaintiffs settlement points. If the differential between the lowest of-
fer that a risk-neutral plaintiff will accept ($250,000) and that which
a risk-averse plaintiff would accept ($230,000) is small ($20,000 in
this case), then the defendant will most likely offer all plaintiffs the
higher figure to avoid trial costs. This strategy will result in a high
level of pre-trial settlements.
If, however, there is a great deal of risk associated with the trial,
and the defendant could extract a relatively large premium from risk-
averse plaintiffs (since they do not want to incur this risk), then the
defendant corporation may pursue a very different strategy. Assume
that some number of plaintiffs are extremely risk averse. Assume
also that although the expected value of the trial is $300,000, a wide
range of potential outcomes creates the possibility, although slight,
that the plaintiff will receive nothing. Some risk-averse plaintiffs
may be willing to accept extremely low settlement offers - such as
$30,000 - to avoid facing the risks associated with trial. If there is
sufficient risk associated with the trial so that the differential be-
tween that which the risk-neutral plaintiffs are willing to accept
($250,000) and that which the risk-averse plaintiffs are willing to set-
tle for ($30,000) is great ($220,000 in this case), the defendant may
pursue a lowball strategy of offering all of the plaintiffs $30,000.41
Although this will result in more of the cases going to trial, the de-
fendant will have profited from the risk aversion of some plaintiffs,
compensating it for the additional cost of going to trial in some
cases.4
2
The hypothesis that an increased level of risk associated with
trial will lead to fewer settlements has serious implications for fee-
shifting statutes. If the Act succeeded in changing individual party's
decision analysis, this could result in fewer pre-trial settlements if
40. See id. at 275.
41. This assumes, of course, that the defendants believe there to be a sufficient
number of risk-averse plaintiffs to render the strategy profit maximizing.
42. This hypothesis should hold true even under a multi-period scenario in which
the defendant can vary its offers in different periods. For example, although in theory
a defendant could make a low settlement offer at first and then raise the offer if the
plaintiff rejected it, this strategy would unravel if used against many plaintiffs be-
cause the defendant would acquire a reputation for bluffing.
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repeat-player defendants pursue a "sorting" strategy. Furthermore,
the plaintiffs who found themselves forced to settle for extremely low
figures would not necessarily be those individuals with the least valid
claims. Instead, those parties who simply possessed the least toler-
ance for risk would accept extremely low settlement offers, regardless
of the merits of their case. This potential outcome not only contra-
dicts one of the stated purposes of the Act - to reduce the court
docket and encourage early settlement - but also results in the man-
ifestly unjust result of penalizing those parties (usually poor or mid-
dle income individuals) who fear risk.
C. Principal-Agent Problems
Negotiation analysis of principal-agent relationships provides a
third lens through which to consider the Attorney Accountability Act.
Principal-agent relationships involve the delegation of certain au-
thority or responsibilities from the principal to the agent.43 Because
clients often ask their lawyers to negotiate on their behalf,44 legal
disputes commonly involve complex principal-agent dynamics.
Such relationships confer numerous benefits upon both agent
and principal, particularly because agents commonly have special-
ized knowledge, resources, or skills that principals lack. This is par-
ticularly true in attorney-client relationships. Nevertheless,
principal-agent relationships also introduce potential problems. In
theory, an agent is delegated authority to "do the principal's bidding."
In practice, however, principals and agents can differ on three funda-
mental issues: incentives, information and preferences.45 An oppor-
tunistic agent can exploit these differences in order to satisfy their
own, rather than their principal's interests.
The Act's failure to address such principal-agent problems di-
rectly may have several important consequences. First, because the
Act merely changes the principal's incurred risk and not the agent's,
it may have little effect on settlement decisions if the agent heavily
43. See RicHARD J. ZECKHAUSER, STRATEGY AND CHOICE 2 (1991). For an excel-
lent overview of principal-agent problems, see JOHN D. PRATT & RIcHARD J.
ZECKHAUSER, PRINCIPALS & AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 1-35 (1985).
44. The legal definition of an agency relationship is straightforward. "Agency is
the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person
to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent
by the other to so act." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958).
45. See ZECKHAUSER, supra note 43. See generally Robert H. Mnookin, Why Nego-
tiations Fail:An Exploration of Barriers to the Resolution of Conflict, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON




influences or is in control of the decision-making process. The Act
may convince a fully-informed plaintiff - as principal - that the
risk of having to compensate the other side's attorneys' fees is suffi-
cient to warrant settlement. If the plaintiff delegates decision-mak-
ing authority to his lawyer, however, or the lawyer strategically
withholds relevant information regarding the settlement decision,
this risk may not come into play. Because the Act in no way alters
the incentives of the lawyer, it may fail to encourage settlement.
The extent to which lawyers control their clients' decision-mak-
ing is, of course, an empirical question, and one about which we have
little data. All lawyers may not enjoy a level of independence that
enables them to make decisions contrary to their clients' interests, 46
and even very independent attorneys will undoubtedly often remain
faithful to their clients' interests. This will not always be the case,
however. Some attorneys cheat.
Further, it is important to remember that the Act attempts to
influence settlement behavior by changing only one variable: the par-
ties' transaction costs. Transaction costs are squarely within the
agent's domain: they are one thing about which an agent almost cer-
tainly knows more than the principal.47 Thus, for example, a lawyer
will be more able than her client to estimate what fees will likely be
incurred throughout litigation. Under the Act, of course, a litigant
would need to estimate the other side's likely attorneys' fees in order
to factor the burden of paying those fees into the litigant's settlement
decision. Again, it seems reasonable to assume that clients will turn
46. Lawyers are often accused of delaying or preventing settlement in order to
increase their personal financial gain. In class actions, for example, representative
attorneys may reject a settlement that offers inadequate attorney compensation in
favor of trying the case in court where attorneys' fees are virtually guaranteed. See
Deborah L, Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1183, 1204-15
(1982); see also Robert H. Mlnookin & Robert B. Wilson, Rational Bargaining and
Market Efficiency: Understanding Pennzoil v. Texaco, 75 VA. L. Rav. 295, 299 (1989)
(identifying an agency problem in which the officers and directors of Texaco preferred
to pursue litigation to seek complete vindication rather than settle, which would have
satisfied the interests of the company's shareholders - their principals).
Conversely, plaintiffs' lawyers working on a contingent fee are often criticized for
seeking premature settlements to further their own economic interests. See John C.
Coffee, Jr., The Regulation ofEntrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Effi-
ciency in the Large Class Action, 54U. Cm. L. REv. 877, 883-89 (1987). See generally
John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Eco-
nomic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions,
86 COLUM. L. Rav. 669, 677-84 (1986).
47. As Paul Milgrim and John Roberts have pointed out, "the agent's interests
commonly differ from the principal's and the principal cannot evaluate how well the
agent has worked or whether the agent has been honest." PAUL Mn.GIm & JOHN
ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 195 (1992).
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to their attorneys for such estimates. 48 Moreover, because the Act
provides that a litigant can only be liable for the other side's fees up
to the amount that the litigant herself spent on attorneys,49 the law-
yer's estimate of his own fees remains fundamentally important. It
seems very likely, therefore, that litigants - particularly individual,
inexperienced litigants - will simply ask their lawyers to keep the
effects of the Act in mind; in short, they will delegate to the lawyer
responsibility for estimating costs. Again, because the lawyer may
have independent incentives, the Act may not ultimately lead the
parties to settle any earlier than they would have before the Act was
passed.50
In addition, principal-agent problems might increase, rather
than decrease, the number of meritless claims brought. Consider the
situation from the perspective of a plaintiff's attorney. With the Act
in effect, risk-averse plaintiffs might now settle their cases earlier,
and for less money. Although a lawyer may not have to expend much
effort to reap the returns of such quick settlements, smaller settle-
ments mean lower total returns for the lawyer if he or she works on a
contingency basis. Viewed broadly, rather than at the level of an in-
dividual case, what systemic incentive does this create for the attor-
ney? We might predict that if an attorney's return per case drops,
she will have an incentive to bring more, not fewer, cases. Where will
these cases come from? Most likely, these cases will come from the
48. This delegation of decision-making seems particularly probable when an indi-
vidual plaintiff has hired an attorney on a contingency fee basis but requires an esti-
mate of the defendant's incurred attorneys' fees, which were most likely billed at an
hourly rate. Given that the plaintiff is likely to be unfamiliar with the rates charged
by defense counsel or the amount of time that defense work requires, the plaintiff's
lawyer will generally have to assume responsibility for making this estimate.
49. See H.R. 988, supra note 1, at § 2(e)(7).
50. It is worth mentioning that fee structures will play a crucial role in determin-
ing how the proposed legislation affects lawyers' incentives. On the plaintiff's side, a
contingency fee arrangement that subtracted incurred costs prior to calculating the
attorney's percentage could, theoretically, reduce the lawyer's incentive to withhold
information about the Act's effects. (This would only hold true when the lawyer be-
lieved there to be a risk of the plaintiff winning but receiving a judgment for less than
the defendant's final offer). Conversely, a contingency arrangement that did not sub-
tract costs prior to fee calculation would force the litigant to bear the total cost of the
Act's fee-shifting, and would have little or marginal effect on the attorney's incentives.
Likewise, an hourly fee structure does little to align the divergent interests of lawyers
and their clients. A defense firm, for example, would have little economic reason to
inform its client about the Act's risks if the client would ultimately bear the burden
and continuing litigation would benefit the firm through increased billing. We note, of
course, that these principal-agent dilemmas raise difficult questions of ethics and pro-
fessional responsibility well beyond the scope of this comment.
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vast pool of meritless claims that the Act was intended to deter.5'
The Act thus might increase, rather than decrease, the overall vol-
ume of undesirable litigation.
We do not wish to overstate the effect of these principal-agent
problems. The Act targets litigants' pocketbooks and would certainly
alter plaintiffs' decisions. The Act overlooks, however, the important
incentive and information problems inherent to principal-agent rela-
tionships. As a result, it does little to render attorneys more account-
able to their clients or to the courts. Instead, the Act's real impact
will be felt mainly by attorneys' principals, the litigants.
IV. CONCLUSION
Our review of the Attorney Accountability Act suggests various
shortcomings of this type of incentive-based legal reform. The effects
of strategic interaction, opportunism and risk preferences, and prin-
cipal-agent problems, raise questions as to whether the Act would
succeed if passed. Our application of these negotiation concepts sug-
gests that changing litigants' behavior is more complicated than the
Act's proponents predicted, and thus our analysis raises doubts about
the general efficacy of incentive-based reform.
51. We wish to emphasize that we do not necessarily share HR. 988's root as-
sumption that plaintiffs' lawyers are willing or eager to bring claim that they believe
to be meritless. Our point here is merely that on its own terms H.R. 988 may create
the opposite incentives of those sought by the Bill's drafters.
Spring 1996] 237

